



FOREIGN POLICY bulletin

AN ANALYSIS OF CURRENT INTERNATIONAL EVENTS

VOLUME 37 NUMBER 17

The French Mood Today

by August Heckscher

France occupies so crucial a position in NATO and in the entire system of the West's defense that its present mood is a source of profound concern to Americans. On the basis of a recent visit to France, which afforded favorable opportunities for talking with French officials and intellectuals, the following impressions emerge. Many of the problems of two years ago remain unsolved and in suspension, but are embittered today by the added failure and delay.

Now, as then, North Africa forms the center of French preoccupations. But, whereas in 1956 the French could still let their minds rove over a wide range of political and social problems, they seem at present to be able to think of little except Algeria. The three and a half year war in which there is no sign of victory and from which there appears but slight possibility of withdrawal, shapes every other consideration, whether of strategy, of diplomacy or of economics.

In relation to this war NATO seems comparatively unimportant. The French have stripped France of virtually all their troops assigned to NATO without feeling any regret at this diversion or even, which seems stranger,

any alarm at the weakening of their national position. They view NATO as an alliance conceived in the light of a single danger—the danger of Russian aggression—which they now consider remote. In their opinion the need is for a global strategy which can deal with the areas around the circumference of Europe, where the Russians are prepared to make their real gains. They will say frankly that if it were a question of saving North Africa and sacrificing NATO, they would not hesitate at the price.

When the alternatives in North Africa are explored with the French, the great majority of individuals across the political spectrum take a position more moderate than might be expected. Even the conservatives (as distinct from extremists of the far right) are not inclined today to talk as if Algeria were indistinguishable from metropolitan France. They acknowledge the need for a settlement which would put the Algerians on the road to independence. The big questions are of priority and timing. Must pacification come before negotiation or should negotiation begin at once? If negotiation, then with whom? And above all, what safeguards are to be erected

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against the nationalist tide that could submerge and extirpate the 1.2 million people of European origin who have made the Algerian land what it is today? (Even if this figure is no longer accurate, it is sufficiently high to make any French withdrawal a formidable and agonizing move.)

Unfortunately, the expression of moderate views is largely confined to private conversations. In public, political leaders feel themselves under the surveillance of extremist groups and at the mercy of violent tides of opinion. The soldiers who return from the fighting in Algeria are commonly described as being far more obdurate than when they left France, and these add their sentiments to the bitter brew. Just before the Easter recess of Parliament, which prolonged for a fortnight the uneasy life of the Gaillard government, a book by a parachutist who had fought in Algeria was suddenly banned. For several months it had circulated freely and been widely discussed. The general explanation of the incident was that the ban had been exacted as a price for leaving Gaillard temporarily at peace.

The situation in France today recalls the McCarthy period in this country. There is the same subservience of good men to forces which they know to be inimical to everything they stand for, and the same tendency; it seems, to overestimate the actual extent of those forces. Among men of good will in private there is the disposition—one that many of us remember painfully—to subside before the assaults of foreign

observers, when one would like to be able to dismiss their criticisms as exaggerated or absurd.

Crisis of Authority

The French political system is chronically incapable of achieving the authority which might make the Algerian crisis soluble. But today the lack of authority provides a crisis of its own. The fall of the Gaillard government was discounted in advance. In the same way everything that Gaillard tried to do was discounted. The only question was whether the cabinet overturn would lead to another series of political negotiations and the patching together of another ministry—or whether in the interim would occur that deeper change which so many feel to be inevitable. The figure of General Charles de Gaulle is never long out of the French people's thoughts. Yet his views, even on North Africa are at present unknown. I was told by a man who had recently seen him that he apparently had it in mind to let the situation in Algeria simmer if he came to power until the time was ripe for the settlement which now seems impossible. But even his initiatives translate differently the utterances of the oracle. Today de Gaulle stands for nothing—and yet for everything: for the ability to act with decisiveness, where everyone else moves irresolutely and at odds.

One of the more positive signs on the French scene are the current moves toward European unity. Since the war there have been various motivating forces behind the initiatives

for European solidarity—the desire to exercise control over Germany, to obtain larger commitments from Britain, to find a substitute for the decline in French national power. But the motivation behind the present surge is clear. It was inspired by the Suez crisis, and its basic aim is to replace dependence on the United States. For much the same reason the French are driving to produce nuclear weapons. The sense of national prestige, of involvement in the important affairs of the world, is of great importance for France.

In England one has the feeling that people of all ages are vitally concerned with the choices that lie before them. They possess the decisive weapon of the H-bomb: what should they do with it? In France, by contrast, many of the largest issues seem irrelevant. Disengagement? Nuclear tests? A summit conference? The French feel they lack the means seriously to affect the outcome. Yet the French, as one wise observer has remarked to me, have true political genius: if possession of the bomb enables them to exercise it, that in itself might be a good reason for making sure that they obtain it.

Meanwhile, of course, the French landscape is as lovely as ever. Paris is more crowded by cars but still as beautiful. In the past year French industrial production has increased by 8 percent—while ours has fallen by a higher percentage—and unemployment is virtually nonexistent. On April 1, when most of the public services of Paris were halted by a

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Ike's Pentagon Reform: A Great Debate

Only a layman would dare to sum up the highly complex, controversial and crucial issue of Pentagon reform in a brief article. But let us try.

First, what is President Eisenhower's plan? It provides basically for a streamlining job, a simplification of the chain of command, a centralization of authority. It increases the power of the Secretary of Defense. It decreases the power and authority of the service secretaries. It makes the Joint Chiefs of Staff a strategy planning board, directly responsible for operating commands. It makes the military departments administrative, logistic and training agencies. It increases the Defense Secretary's spending powers. It centers research and development in the Secretary, not in the services.

Who is for this plan? First, the President. This is his plan, and he has said with unusual vigor that he would fight for it. His critics, however, ask why the President waited five years after entering the White House to do what he now insists is absolutely essential. For today he is a lame-duck President, since he cannot succeed himself, and his authority with Congress is slipping. He must have been aware that this would happen in his second term, yet he waited until this year to act. But the President has recently coined a slogan for his plan: "Safety with solvency." It will be hard to beat this slogan.

As for the three armed services, it is clear which are for, which against, reorganization. The White House has told them and their brass to speak their minds before Congressional committees, but otherwise to button their lips. If individual officers in any one service cannot swallow this rule,

they are always at liberty to resign.

Basically, it is probably correct to say that the Air Force and the Army are for the plan, the Navy, against it. The Navy league has taken some healthy swings at the plan, but few have equalled that of the "big navy" spokesman in Congress, Representative Carl Vinson, Democrat of Georgia, chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, which is holding extensive hearings on the proposal.

Congressmen are the plan's severest critics, possibly because they are not subject to the restraining influence of the White House. They are also suspicious of White House intentions, and feel that the Executive is trying to cut down their historic powers of the purse.

Criticisms of Plan

Criticisms of the Eisenhower plan include charges that it sets up a Prussian general staff, makes the Defense Secretary a "tsar," and would eliminate the individual services. President Eisenhower says that there is no truth in any of these charges. His plan, he contends, does increase the authority, control and direction of the Defense Secretary, but that is not the same thing as a "tsar." It does demote the individual services in authority, influence and prestige, but that is not the same thing as eliminating them. And it does step up the importance and authority of the Joint Chiefs, but that does not necessarily create the threat that they will become a Prussian staff.

The Senate is going to cause the plan less trouble than the House. Twenty-four Senators have already signed a statement applauding the

plan—among them some who had previously criticized it. But the House, with its control of appropriations, and with Representative Vinson and other pro-Navy men dead set against it, could cause a lot of trouble.

The best guess is that in the end the President and Congress will reach a compromise. The President has already compromised on certain points. He has agreed to limit the Defense Secretary's power to transfer funds; to ask that funds be appropriated direct to the Defense Department rather than to the separate services; and not to request the transfer of authority over funds until next year.

The final result, it is well to remember, will depend not only on what Congress does, but on what the White House does to get what it wants. In the past President Eisenhower has made little use of his considerable reserve powers of persuasion in dealing with Congress on legislative matters. A lot, then, still depends on how strongly, persistently and effectively the President fights for what he believes is imperative for the security of the United States. No one should overlook the fact that in an operation of this size—in terms of both dollars and manpower—there are entrenched interests which are not going to accept changes that cut into their authority and prerogatives without putting up a fierce battle.

The fireworks have already started, with conflicting testimony given in the weeks of hearings. This is one of the transcendent congressional debates, whose outcome will determine the fate of the nation.

NEAL STANFORD



Should U.S. Stop Nuclear Tests?

by Jay Orear

Dr. Orear is assistant professor of physics at Columbia University, where he has been teaching for the past four years. A specialist in high-energy physics, he is currently a member of the Columbia University Inspection Project, which is preparing a report on *Inspection for Disarmament*.

AS A scientist who has recently studied the detection of nuclear-weapons tests, I feel that the reply of our State Department to the March 31 announcement by Russian Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko of the Soviet Union's decision to suspend nuclear tests was scientifically incorrect and misleading. Our statement said the Soviet offer is one "for which there is no system of verification, which can be evaded in secrecy and altered at will." Actually Gromyko had also proposed to sign an agreement which would be backed up by a system of inspection stations inside the Soviet Union.

How Tests Can Be Detected

Just how easy is it to detect secret nuclear-weapons tests? Suppose tomorrow the United States and the U.S.S.R. signed an agreement to stop all tests. I claim that by tomorrow we could also have an adequate inspection system by the simple requirement that all seismographic observatories send copies of their records to a United Nations inspection agency. The Soviet Union has about 75 high-quality seismic stations and would probably be willing to send copies of these records upon request. It would be a great risk to attempt any alteration of these records because they must be self-consistent and also must check with the records of the neighboring free countries. The establishment of several UN monitoring stations inside the Soviet Union would make it impossible to alter these records and get away with it. The conventional above-ground tests could adequately be monitored by

these internal stations in combination with our existing external monitoring system.

Could Russia effectively hide its tests? Actually this apparent scientific controversy which has confused the public is not a controversy. Scientists all agree about the scientific facts of detection. Where we start to disagree is when it comes to unscientific words such as "small," "big," and "effective." We all agree that nuclear explosions can be made so small as to be undetectable. But such an explosion would be much smaller than the smallest nuclear explosion ever made by man. There is a fuzzy dividing line as to the size of an explosion which is detectable. This dividing line is at a safe, low level. In the case of a deep underground test which occurs "simultaneously" with a large earthquake, this fuzzy line is somewhat higher, probably in the kiloton range. One must also keep in mind that a serious risk of possible detection would always accompany any attempt to evade. By the time the guilty party learned just how the seismic signals turned out, it would be too late.

I believe we should try to get as strong an agreement on nuclear tests with as much inspection as possible. But if Russia should object to the unlimited right of access of inspectors to a suspected location, this should not rule out all possibilities for a test-ban agreement. If the inspection agency did have an indication of an unannounced explosion, this most likely would have been a violation of the agreement and Russia would not let us inspect the site.

So whether or not there is a written agreement giving mobility to the inspectors, the end result would be about the same. There are various possibilities for a first-stage agreement. Either tests which are detectable could be banned, or all but the deep underground tests. In any case the spread of nuclear weapons to additional nations must be checked.

Bombs for Small Nations?

The recent request of the Administration for the power to give nuclear bombs to smaller nations is exceedingly dangerous. Our inspection study at Columbia University has concluded that the main delivery system of these smaller nations—and perhaps all nations—will be what we call the "suitcase." If our present nuclear policy continues unchanged, I would predict that within a few years every major American city will contain hidden H-bombs. Our Columbia studies show that it is a simple technical problem to smuggle in nuclear bombs. If several years from now, one of these bombs should go off, we would not even know against whom to retaliate. Thus our government's great hope of security—massive retaliation—is fading away and in a few years will become meaningless and useless. The present concept of defense is also obsolete. It certainly is not a valid reason for continuing the bomb tests. Antimissile missiles with "clean" warheads cannot stop the "suitcase."

Suppose the fundamental policy of the United States really was to achieve world disarmament with

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by Edward Teller and Albert L. Latter*

Dr. Teller is associate director of the Radiation Laboratory at the University of California and serves on the AEC General Advisory Committee and the Air Force Scientific Advisory Board. Dr. Latter is a theoretical physicist with the Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, which specializes in advanced research and engineering for the Air Force.

MANY people feel that tests should be discontinued. This feeling is widespread and strong. The question of tests is obviously important. It may influence our security as individuals. It certainly will influence our security as a nation. If in a free, democratic country the majority believes that something should be done—it will be done. The sovereign power in a democracy is “the people.” It is of the greatest importance that the people should be honestly and completely informed about all relevant facts. In no other way can a sound decision be reached. . . .

Unfortunately much of the discussion about continued experimentation with nuclear explosives has been carried out in a most emotional and confused manner. One argument concerning tests is so fantastic that it deserves to be mentioned for that very reason: It has been claimed that nuclear explosions may change the axis of the earth. . . .

Is Fallout Dangerous?

The argument about world-wide radioactive fallout is more serious. It is asserted that fallout is dangerous and that we are ignorant of the extent of the danger.

In a narrow, literal sense both these statements are correct. But in the preceding chapters [of this book] we have seen that the danger is limited. We do not know precisely how great it is. We do know, however, that the danger is considerably small-

er than the danger from other radiations to which we continue to expose ourselves without worry. The danger from the tests is quite small compared with the effects of X-rays used in medical practice. The fallout produces only a fraction of the increase in cosmic ray effect to which a person subjects himself when he moves from the seashore to a place of higher altitude like Colorado. People may or may not be damaged by the fallout. But it is quite certain that the damage is far below a level of which we usually take notice.

Fallout in the vicinity of the test sites did cause damage. In the past this damage was not great although in one Pacific test it was serious. Precautions have been increased and we may hope that future accidents will be avoided altogether. The safety record of the Atomic Energy Commission compares favorably with other enterprises of similar scale.

It seems probable that the root of the opposition to further tests is not connected with fallout. The root is deeper. The real reason against further tests is connected with our desire for disarmament and for peace. . . .

Desire for Peace

In the uneasy world in which we live today no reasonable person will advocate unilateral disarmament. What people hope is that all sides will agree to reduce their military power and thereby contribute to a more peaceful atmosphere. The elimination of tests has appeared possible and proper for two reasons. One is that tests are conspicuous, and therefore it is believed that we can

check whether or not testing has actually been stopped by everyone. The second reason is that nuclear explosives already represent such terrifying power that further tests appear useless and irrational. These arguments are simple and almost universally accepted. They are based on misconceptions.

A nuclear explosion is a violent event, but in the great expanses of our globe such tests can be effectively hidden if appropriate care is taken to hide them. There can be no doubt that this is possible. The question is only how much it costs to hide a test and how big is the explosion that can be carried out in secret for a certain amount of expenditure.

If an agreement were made to discontinue the tests, the United States would surely keep such an agreement. The very social and political structure of our country excludes the possibility that many people would collaborate in breaking an international undertaking. Whether Russia would or would not keep such an agreement would depend on the ingenuity of the Russians, on their willingness to make economic sacrifices, and on their honesty. Of these three factors we can have a firm opinion about the first. The Russians are certainly ingenious enough to devise secret methods of testing. As to the other question, whether the Russians will want to invest the effort and whether they will be bound by their word, we feel that each man is entitled to his own opinion. According to past experience, an agreement to stop tests may well be followed by secret and successful tests behind the iron curtain.

In a more general way we may ask the question: Is it wise to make agreements which honesty will respect, but dishonesty can circumvent? Shall we put a free, democratic government at a disadvantage compared to the absolute power of a dic-

* This article consists of excerpts, reprinted with permission, from chapter XV of the authors' book, *Our Nuclear Future: Facts, Dangers and Opportunities* (New York, Criterion Books, Inc., 1958. \$3.50).

tatorship? Shall we introduce prohibition in a new form, just to give rise to bootlegging on a much greater scale? It is almost certain that in the competition between prohibition and bootlegging, the bootlegger will win. . . .

Tests Must Be Continued

The radioactive fallout from nuclear testing gives rise to a possible danger which is quite limited in size. The danger from the fallout in a nuclear war, however, would be real and great. If we stop testing now, and if we should fail to develop to the fullest possible extent these clean weapons, we should unnecessarily kill a great number of non-combatants. Not to develop the explosives with the smallest radioactive fallout would, indeed, be completely inexcusable.

The only alternative is that nuclear weapons should not be used at all. Since these weapons have been presented as purely evil instruments, most people hope that they will never be used, and indeed one should hope that wars, and therefore the use of these weapons, can be avoided.

But in our conflict with the powerful Communist countries which strive for world domination, it may be too much to hope for uninterrupted peace. If we abandon our light and mobile weapons, we shall enable the Red bloc to take over one country after another, close to their borders, as opportunities arise. The free nations cannot maintain the massive armies throughout the world which would be required to resist such piecemeal aggression. On the other hand the flexible power of clean nuclear explosives would put us in a position where we could resist aggression in any part of the world, practically at a moment's notice.

The announced policy of our coun-

try is to maintain peace and stability in the world. By being patient and prepared we are trying to arrive at a world order based on law and justice for all peoples. There is no doubt that this policy is supported by the overwhelming majority of Americans. Our armed forces need the greatest possible flexibility in order to give strength to this policy. Such flexibility we can possess only if we have in our possession the strongest, best developed weapons which are also the cleanest, so that they may be used for defense rather than for random destruction.

--If we renounce nuclear weapons; we open the door to aggression. If we fail to develop clean explosives, we expose people to disaster from radioactive fallout in any serious military conflict. To our way of thinking these are weighty arguments in favor of continued experimentation and development of nuclear weapons. But still another, more general, point of view should be considered.

The spectacular developments of the last centuries, in science, in technology and in our everyday life, have been based on one important premise: to explore fearlessly any consequences to which greater knowledge and improved skills can lead us. When we talk about nuclear tests, we have in mind not only military preparedness but also the execution of experiments which will give us more insight and more ability to control the forces of nature. There are many specific political and military reasons why such experiments should not be abandoned. There also exists this very general reason—the tradition of exploring the unknown. We can follow this tradition, and we can at the same time be increasingly careful that radioactivity, carelessly dispersed, should not interfere with human life.

Orear

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adequate safeguards. Then the first-step agreement along these lines should be the one which is easiest for both sides to accept. The best possibility right now is an agreement to stop nuclear-weapons tests. Russia has expressed strong willingness for such an agreement—even with inspection. According to our Columbia studies, a nuclear weapons test-ban is one of the easiest to inspect. On the other hand, the inspection system our group envisages for controlling nuclear production is one of the most difficult. It requires many inspectors with free access to virtually all restricted areas.

There is a widespread impression that our government's refusal to break up its disarmament package proposal is a method used to avoid agreement. Why else should we insist on the "last step" as a requirement for the "first step?" I conclude that our reason for this impossible position is that fundamentally Washington is opposed to disarmament.

Dr. Teller expressed this philosophy very plainly when he said "disarmament is a lost cause." This explains why some of our officials say we must continue to endure the risk of a fallout war. Yet our government's present policy is increasing the risk of all-out war as compared to the "relaxation-of-tension" approach, which might reduce the risk.

As the first step in reversing the fatal direction of our foreign policy, I would urge that we immediately declare our willingness to sign an agreement to stop nuclear testing with adequate controls. If Russia balks, then we finally will have won the propaganda battle against Moscow. If it agrees, then we all will have won something much more important—a last chance to save the world from nuclear devastation.



Russia Has Problems Too

In the midst of pessimistic comments here and abroad about the myriad problems faced by the United States in world affairs, we are apt to overlook the fact that Russia has problems too.

True, Moscow has won a series of propaganda victories in the past few months by being the first to launch an earth satellite and to announce the unilateral although conditional suspension of nuclear tests. But it has suffered defeats in a field where it is most sensitive—in its relations with Communist Yugoslavia, which is challenging Khrushchev, as it once challenged Stalin in 1948.

Marshal Tito's conflict with Moscow, which appeared to have been eased if not entirely healed since Stalin's death, was renewed on the occasion of the seventh congress of the Yugoslav League of Communists at Ljubljana which opened on April 22.

The immediate issue was a full-scale attack which the Soviet magazine *Kommunist*, theoretical organ of the party, made on the new draft program of the Yugoslav Communists on the eve of the congress. This attack was presented in a 6,000-word article which was broadcast twice over the weekend of April 19 for the information of Soviet representatives abroad. This article declared that the Russian Communist party does not wish to obtain reconciliation with Marshal Tito's Communists "by means of concessions at the expense of Marxist-Leninist principles," and charged the Yugoslavs with having included in their program obvious divergences from the fundamentals of Marxist-Leninist theory on a number of points.

Aware that the new program

would provoke criticisms in Moscow, the Yugoslav leaders had toned it down in some respects in advance of the congress. Their changes, however, either did not mollify Russian critics or had come after publication of the *Kommunist* article.

Tito's View of Capitalism

Apparently the main point in the Yugoslav program which aroused Moscow's ire was the argument made in Belgrade that, contrary to accepted Communist doctrine, the working class in a capitalist state need not necessarily sink into deeper and deeper poverty while monopoly capitalists accumulate more wealth and power. According to the Yugoslavs, "the capitalist system in its classical form is increasingly becoming a thing of the past." The state apparatus, they contend, "places itself over and above society and tends increasingly to restrict both the role of private capital and of the working class." Thus capitalist society is brought "nearer to socialism, and thereby to new political victories of the working class. In other words, the swelling wave of state capitalist tendencies in the capitalist world is the most obvious proof that mankind is indomitably moving into the era of socialism through a wide variety of different roads."

What the Yugoslav program appears to say is that there is no irreconcilable conflict between capitalism which, in its view, is being transformed into socialism, and Yugoslavia's own form of communism, which is also described as "socialism."

This contention appears to mean two things, both of which would be in conflict with Moscow's views.

First, it means that there can be more than "coexistence" between the two systems of capitalism and communism—that there can actually be cooperation, on the assumption that both are pursuing the same goals, although by different roads. And, second, it means that modern capitalism in the Western nations is not inimical to the working class, but actually promotes its interests. In short, the Yugoslav program constitutes an argument for ideological peace—not only for a military, political and economic truce—and thus an argument against the continuance of ideological blocs.

Tito also had harsh words to say about the Soviet "bureaucracy." The impact of this criticism, however, was weakened by his own resentment of similar criticisms of bureaucracy in Yugoslavia made by his former friend and associate, Milovan Djilas, in *The New Class* (New York, Praeger, 1957), whom the marshal holds in jail.

Mutual Accusations

The new conflict between Moscow and Belgrade has revived accusations made by both sides a decade ago. The Russians declare that Yugoslavia is attempting to "weaken" the unity of the Communist camp and demand that the Yugoslavs retract their "wrong statements." The Yugoslavs, for their part, as indicated by Marshal Tito's unrepentant and much-applauded address at the Ljubljana congress, call on the Soviet leaders to give up their "absurd" ideas about re-educating Yugoslavia and bringing it back into the Eastern bloc, and to stop intervening in its internal affairs. At the same time they assert

that they do not need "any certificate" of their Marxism-Leninism. The League of Communists, said Vice President Edvard Kardelj, "has always been true to the teaching of Marxism and Leninism and has drawn its program on this basis in accordance with its opinion of the needs of the working class and the peoples of Yugoslavia."

The conflict is fraught with far-reaching consequences. Does it indicate, as some American students of Russia believe, that Khrushchev, who initiated Moscow's reconciliation with Yugoslavia in 1955 in defiance of Molotov and other "old Bolsheviks" now in disgrace, is himself facing a challenge from Stalinist theoreticians like Mikhail A. Suslov, whose star has been noticeably rising? Or is he himself disturbed about the possible disintegration of the Soviet bloc if other countries, notably Poland, should once more be tempted to follow Marshal Tito's lead? Will this fear, assuming it exists, cause a dangerous hardening of Russia's foreign policy after a period of relatively greater flexibility? Will Poland, which had experienced a liberalizing thaw, and had been sympathetic to Yugoslavia's course, now find it necessary, because of its strategic position between Germany and Russia, to tighten its Communist dictatorship, as seems to be the case? And if

so, was a historic moment missed somewhere along the way—by the U.S.S.R., by the West, by Yugoslavia—for an attempt at reconciliation between the two blocs?

One thing should be noted, however. In spite of the harsh attacks made on each other by Moscow and Belgrade, spokesmen for both countries—and among them Marshal Tito—have stressed their desire to maintain friendly relations between the two countries; and on a wide range of current foreign policy issues the two Communist governments are in agreement, notably in their opposition to the arming of West Germany with nuclear weapons and their desire for "disengagement" and cessation of nuclear tests.

VERA MICHELES DEAN

Heckscher

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one-day demonstration strike, I commented to one Frenchman on the equanimity with which the widespread inconvenience was accepted. "Well," he said, "it's a beautiful day." All this makes an incongruous background for the somber events which seem incontestably to lie below the surface.

Mr. Heckscher, director of The Twentieth Century Fund since January 1956, and member of the Editorial Advisory Committee of the Foreign Policy Association, recently attended in Paris, under French aus-

pices, a renewal of the 1956 Arden House Conference on Franco-American relations. Previously chief editorial writer of the New York *Herald Tribune*, he is also author, well-known speaker and frequent guest on radio and television panels on international affairs.

FPA Bookshelf

ASIA

The Far East, by Fred Greene of Williams College (New York, Rinehart, 1957, \$8.00) is a useful, well-arranged textbook which includes material not only on the Far East, but also on Southeast Asia and on India and Pakistan. In *Chinese Thought and Institutions*, edited by John K. Fairbank of Harvard University (published by the University of Chicago Press, 1957, \$8.50, in its series of Comparative Studies of Cultures and Civilizations) a group of scholars examine the growth of Chinese ideas over 25 centuries, through literature, philosophy, religion, painting and social institutions. Tien-fong Cheng, former Minister of Education of the Republic of China, gives a detailed analysis of China's relations with Russia in *A History of Sino-Russian Relations* (Washington, D.C., Public Affairs Press, 1957, \$6.00).

W. S. Woytinsky, the eminent economist, presents a somewhat disjointed picture of India's arduous economic development in *India: the Awakening Giant* (New York, Harper's, 1957, \$3.75). Students of Indian ideas will find a valuable selection of readings in *A Source Book in Indian Philosophy*, edited by Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, India's philosopher-vice-president, and Charles A. Moore (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1957, \$5.00). In *New Era in the Non-Western World* (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1957, \$3.00), Cornelis W. de Kiewiet, president of the University of Rochester and five members of the Rochester faculty, including Vera Micheles Dean, analyze the main forces that are shaping the political, economic and social development of the non-Western peoples.

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